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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Henry Gibbs appeals from the final order of the 
district court dismissing his §1983 suit under the "three 
strikes rule" of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§1915(g).1 We will vacate the district court's order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. §1915(g) provides: 
 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment 
 
                                2 
I. 
 
Appellant Henry Gibbs, a prisoner who filed his 
complaint pro-se but is presently represented by counsel, 
brings this §1983 action against Marcia Roman, the 
librarian at SCI-Somerset. Gibbs was formerly incarcerated 
at SCI-Somerset. Gibbs alleges that defendant Roman 
violated his constitutional rights when, in November 1995, 
she permitted an inmate-law clerk to read Gibbs' legal 
papers, reflecting information that he had been a 
government informant. This allegedly resulted in threats 
against Gibbs' life and physical attacks against him by 
other inmates.2 
 
On August 27, 1996, after entertaining Gibbs' Motion to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("i.f.p."), the district court 
adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate 
Judge, and dismissed Gibbs' complaint under 28 U.S.C. 
§1915(g).3 The court found that Gibbs did not qualify for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical 
injury. 
 
2. More specifically, while Gibbs was "in the hole", he sent legal papers 
to librarian Roman to get them photocopied, with knowledge that they 
would be handled by inmate-law clerks. The content of the papers 
revealed that Gibbs had been a government informant. After reading the 
papers, the inmate-law clerk who was making the photocopies for Gibbs, 
allegedly confronted Gibbs, called him a "snitch", threatened to kill him, 
and told other inmates that he was an informant, resulting in two 
alleged physical attacks against Gibbs. 
 
Six months after these attacks, in May 1996, Gibbsfiled this §1983 
action against the librarian, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety, 
health and serious medical need; mental stress, conspiracy and 
retaliation. Gibbs sought compensatory damages in the amount of 
$80,000, and punitive damages in excess of $80,000. 
 
In November 1996, Gibbs was transferred from SCI-Somerset to SCI- 
Graterford. 
 
3. In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that Gibbs' i.f.p. motion be denied without prejudice to 
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i.f.p. status since he had previously filed three frivolous 
lawsuits and was not in "imminent danger of serious 
physical injury". 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). Gibbs then filed the 
instant appeal. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this §1983 matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. Our 




The primary question that we must answer in this appeal 
is whether Gibbs' i.f.p. petition meets the criterion of 
§1915(g) which provides an exception to the "three strikes" 
rule for inmates who are in "imminent danger of serious 
physical injury".4 
 
Gibbs' complaint charged that on December 4th and 10th 
1995, among other things, 
 
 1. Inmate Holmes threatened to kill Plaintiff 
because of the letter from U.S. Attorney [name deleted], 
that revealed that Plaintiff was a government witness... 
 
* * * * 
 
 4. Plaintiff states as a fact that, on two seperate 
[sic] occasions, Plaintiff was physically attacked by 
several inmates, because of the exposure that Plaintiff 
was a government witness... 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gibbs submitting the full filing fee within 20 days. The district court, 
however, after entertaining Gibbs' objections and adopting the Report 
and Recommendation, ordered that the entire case should be dismissed, 
and did not indicate whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or 
"without prejudice". We therefore interpret the dismissal to be "with 
prejudice", since the district court did not indicate to the contrary. 
4. Gibbs raised various constitutional challenges to the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act which Roman responded to in her papers. Gibbs argued that 
the Act violates due process by being impermissibly retroactive, since it 
treats pre-enactment lawsuits as "strikes"; that the statute violates the 
constitutional rights of indigent prisoners by restricting their access to 
court; and that the statute violates 5th amendment equal protection by 
being both over-broad and under-inclusive. We decline to reach these 
constitutional challenges at this time. See infra Part IV. 
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 5. Plaintiff alleges that, due to this life threatening 
situation, Plaintiff has suffered further mental stress... 
 
 5. [sic] Plaintiff alleges that ...Plaintiff 's life is in 
constant danger because of Defendants [sic] delibrate 
[sic] indifference to Plaintiff 's safety. 
 
In dismissing Gibbs' case, the district court found that 
although Gibbs had made vague allegations that his"life is 
in constant danger" as a result of one inmate calling him a 
"snitch" and threatening his life, and other inmates 
attacking him, Gibbs had failed to demonstrate imminent 
harm, and therefore did not fall within the statutory 
exception. 
 
On appeal, Gibbs argues that his contention that he was 
physically attacked on at least two occasions satisfies the 
"imminent danger" exception to the statute. He further 
argues that, when considering an i.f.p. application, a court 
must construe all factual allegations in favor of the 
petitioner, citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 
(1992). 
 
In response, defendant Roman argues that Gibbs' life was 
not in danger at the time he filed his complaint, since he 
waited six months to file suit and did not produce any 
evidence of actual danger. Roman further argues that, by 
filing a suit for damages rather than injunctive relief, Gibbs 
was not seeking to protect his physical safety. Therefore 
she claims that allowing Gibbs' suit to go forward (i.e. by 
finding that he falls within the statutory exception) would 
not serve to remedy the alleged dangerous situation, which 
is the goal of the exception. Finally, Roman argues that, 
even if Gibbs had been in danger when he filed the suit, he 
has since been transferred to another prison, and therefore 
need no longer fear assaults.5 
 
The amicus brief filed by United States argues that we 
should remand this case to the district court for further 
fact-finding on the issue of imminent danger. The United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Roman also notes that, although Gibbs only had $4.43 in his prison 
account at the time of filing suit, Gibbs, in the twelve months preceding 
the filing of his complaint, had a total of $497 that passed in and out of 
his account. 
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States contends that the district court dismissed Gibbs' 
claim of danger "without substantive discussion", and that 
further probing of the issue is necessary in order to 
determine whether Gibbs falls within the "imminent 
danger" exception. The United States argues that, although 
Gibbs' allegations of danger were vague, "his allegations are 
sufficient to require further inquiry". The amicus brief also 
recommends that the district court explore the impact of 
Gibbs' subsequent transfer to another prison, and whether 




Upon review, we hold that the district court erred in 
discrediting Gibbs' allegations of imminent danger when it 
summarily dismissed his complaint under the "three 
strikes" rule. Under our liberal pleading rules, during the 
initial stage of litigation, a district court should construe all 
allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. See, 
e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land 
Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).6 In this case, 
Gibbs' claims of danger as stated in his complaint were 
rejected on their face by both the Magistrate Judge and the 
district court. Neither reviewed the complaint in light of our 
standard which requires that credit be given to all 
allegations in the complaint. No challenge to the allegations 
was made by defendant Roman (understandably, because 
the complaint had yet to be served upon her). 
 
Gibbs' complaint clearly set out: (1) allegations of past 
attacks by other inmates; (2) allegations of death threats 
made by other inmates -- thereby substantiating a claim of 
imminent danger of serious physical harm; (3) a claim for 
damages stemming directly from the physical harm posed 
to him by other inmates as an alleged result of Roman's 
actions. Gibbs' complaint therefore provided allegations of 
imminent danger experienced at the time the alleged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also note that pro se complaints are held to less stringent pleading 
requirements. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In 
the instant case, although Gibbs had an attorney on appeal, Gibbs filed 
his initial complaint pro se. 
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incidents took place (December 1995), sufficient to survive 
the "three strikes" rule. By failing to consider the 
allegations of imminent danger, the district court ignored 
both the dictates of 1915(g) and, more particularly, the 
standard of giving credit to the allegations of the 
complainant as they appeared in the complaint. 
 
We hold, therefore, that a complaint alleging imminent 
danger -- even if brought after the prior dismissal of three 
frivolous complaints -- must be credited as having satisfied 
the threshold criterion of §1915(g) unless the"imminent 
danger" element is challenged. If the defendant, after 
service, challenges the allegations of imminent danger (as 
Roman has done here on appeal), the district court must 
then determine whether the plaintiff 's allegation of 
imminent danger is credible, as of the time the alleged 
incident occurred, in order for the plaintiff to proceed on 
the merits i.f.p. Of course, if the defendant disproves the 
charge that the plaintiff was placed in imminent danger at 
the time of the incident alleged, then the threshold criterion 
of §1915(g) will not have been satisfied and the plaintiff 
may not proceed absent the payment of the requisitefiling 
fee. We emphasize that the proper focus when examining 
an inmate's complaint filed pursuant to §1915(g) must be 
the imminent danger faced by the inmate at the time of the 
alleged incident, and not at the time the complaint was 
filed. 
 
In resolving a contested issue of imminent danger, the 
district court may rely upon evidence supplied by sworn 




7. After the threshold issue of imminent danger is resolved as noted in 
text, the focus of the litigation may generally shift to other issues. 
Satisfaction of the "imminent danger" element does no more than permit 
the complainant to proceed with his or her cause of action without 
payment of the filing fee. Once the fee barrier has been overcome, the 
merits of the cause of action itself are then available for consideration 
and decision. 
 
For example, if the substance of the complaint deals with claims 
unrelated to the issue of imminent danger (such as allegations of 
inadequate prison conditions or discrimination or violation of religious 
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Thus, on remand, if the district court determines that 
Gibbs, indeed, was in imminent danger of bodily harm in 
December 1995 when the alleged incidents occurred, he 
should be granted i.f.p. status and his complaint should be 
allowed to go forward on the merits. If, on the other hand, 
the district court determines that at the time the"imminent 
danger" incidents occurred, Gibbs' allegations of imminent 
danger did not satisfy the §1915(g) standard, then at that 
time, Gibbs' i.f.p. petition can properly be dismissed under 
§1915(g), and Gibbs will be able to proceed only if he pays 




The constitutional issues advanced by Gibbs which we 
have declined to reach here, see note 4 supra, can properly 
be raised in the district court in the first instance. Since 
Gibbs failed to raise these issues before the district court in 
the instant case, we expressly decline to address or decide 
them here even though they have been briefed before us. 
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's order and 
remand for proceedings consistent with the foregoing 
opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 





practices) and the claim of imminent danger stemmed from retaliation 
for the filing of the complaint, once the §1915(g) threshold has been met, 
the "imminent danger" issue may be totally irrelevant to the adjudication 
of the merits of the alleged constitutional violations. This is so, even 
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